Threat intelligence firm Spur Intelligence Labs scanned 6,038 LG webOS and Samsung Tizen smart TV apps and found 2,058 — roughly one in three overall, and approaching half on LG — containing residential proxy SDKs from Bright Data, Massive, and Honeygain/Oxylabs. These SDKs silently relay third-party internet traffic through the household’s IP address and home network connection, typically in exchange for allowing the app to run ad-free. Consent prompts exist but appear once during setup and all three SDKs continue operating as background processes after the app is closed. Spur’s analysis found that in many cases the proxy company itself — or a shell publisher bearing its name — appears to be the app’s developer, with Bright Data-affiliated entities publishing 367 flagged apps alone, suggesting the apps are built primarily as delivery vehicles for the proxy infrastructure rather than genuine utilities.
The research highlights a significant platform policy gap: Amazon’s Fire TV explicitly prohibits apps that facilitate third-party proxy services, and Roku reportedly bars Bright SDK and similar tools entirely. LG and Samsung have drawn no equivalent public line. Beyond bandwidth hijacking, Spur warns the risk extends to local network exposure — the SDK-equipped TV sits inside the home network and can theoretically reach routers, NAS devices, cameras, and other LAN-connected hardware. Bright Data’s SDK ships with a private-range IP blocklist, but the Massive and Honeygain/Oxylabs samples Spur examined did not include equivalent local-network filtering, meaning the protective boundary is enforced by the proxy provider’s server-side policy rather than any technical control on the device. All three vendors responded to Spur prior to publication, citing KYC vetting, traffic restrictions, and third-party audits; Spur’s conclusion is that those controls do not change the underlying reality that users of devices they consider furniture are unknowingly participating in commercial proxy networks.